A new measure of cross-national corruption is constructed based on the geographic distribution of public officials involved in cross-border corruption cases. A comparison is made between the Public Administration Corruption Index (PACI) and perception-based measures, considers the extent to which differences between them are driven by systematic factors, and concludes that they are not. As more data on cases of cross-border bribery incidents become available, the PACI will provide an increasingly valid cross-national measure of corruption.
The PACI is described in the next section. Section II introduces the dataset and presents the computation of the index. Section III shows that the PACI is highly correlated with existing perception-based measures of corruption and considers the determinants of the observed differences. Section IV discusses available evidence regarding the assumptions that ensure the validity of the index, which are described in detail in Appendix A. Section V concludes.
I. The Public Administration Corruption Index
To illustrate the mechanics of the PACI, it is necessary at the outset to distinguish cases of cross-border corruption (involving firms from the headquarters country i bribing public officials in the foreign country j) based on where they were enforced first, that is, the country whose judiciary was the first to take action on a particular corruption case. The vast majority of cross-border corruption cases were first enforced in headquarters countries, comprised mostly of developed nations. This is expected, because the FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention were envisioned precisely to address the lax policing of corruption in many foreign countries where multinational firms operate. It is also possible that corruption cases are first enforced in a third country, mainly because of broad interpretations of the extent of the jurisdiction of the United States, which covers companies registered in its Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and, generally, entities carrying out their businesses in the United States. 7 The intuition behind the PACI is best described by means of a simple example, illustrated in Table 1 . The available data (to be presented in detail in Section III) indicate the presence of 315 cases of crossborder alleged corruption, first enforced in the United States and involving firms headquartered in the same country. If the public officials of all countries trading with the United States were equally corrupt, the 315 cases could be expected to be distributed according to the number of bilateral transactions, which can be proxied by bilateral trade flows. Exports to China represented 9.29 percent of total US exports, implying an expected number of 29.26 cases (Table 1) . However, the number of actual observed occurrences of corruption is 65, or 20.63 percent of the total. Thus, the number of cross-border corruption cases involving Chinese public officials was 2.22 times more than what could be expected if the total number of cases first enforced in the United States, and involving firms headquartered there, were distributed geographically according to the countries' shares in US exports (see the last column of Table 1 ). This provides evidence that the level of corruption exhibited by public officials in China is higher than the average level demonstrated by the public officials of all trade partners of the United States.
In comparison, Austria was pegged as the destination of 0.31 percent of total US exports (Table 1) . It registered one reported case of bilateral corruption, corresponding to 0.32 percent of the total. Based on 7 After a case is first enforced in the headquarters country or in a third-country jurisdiction, it may also fall under the radar of the foreign country's judiciary. Notes: Cases reported are those first pursued in the headquarters country (HQ), 1998-2012. FO: Foreign country. The total number of cases first pursued in the United States is 315, while the total number of cases first pursued in Germany is 56. Data sources are reported in Appendix B.
these figures, the level of corruption demonstrated by Austrian public officials is shown to be close to the average level, with the ratio tallied at 1.02.
Similarly, occurrences of corruption from the point of view of other countries may be considered. Germany, for instance, could be designated as the headquarters country. The available data indicate that there were four cases involving Chinese public officials, out of a total of 56 documented cases of corruption involving firms headquartered in Germany (and first enforced in the same country). The tally would also lead to the conclusion that China's public officials are more corrupt than the average trade partners of Germany. Meanwhile, Austria registered fewer cases of cross-border corruption despite having a larger share of German exports (see the last column of Table 1 ).
The PACI is based not only on one or two "points of observation", but it aggregates cases involving firms headquartered in any country. This reasoning does not need any assumption with respect to the probability that cases in a given country would be enforced. Notably, that there were 315 cases of corruption involving firms headquartered in the United States and only 56 in Germany (with enforcement occurring first in the respective countries) has no implications with respect to levels of corruption in the United States or in Germany. It is the distribution of these cases (regardless of how many there are) abroad which conveys information that could help determine the level of corruption in the countries where the bribery of foreign officials takes place.
The PACI
The incidents of corruption involving firms in i that implicate public officials in j and first enforced in the headquarters' country i is indicated by cases obs HQ i;j . The PACI z compares the total number of those cases with the expected number of corrupt transactions that would be observed if their spatial distribution reflected bilateral trade shares between the headquarters countries and z:
Eðcases obs HQ i;z Þ Á 100; with i 6 ¼ z:
The numerator, P cases obs HQ i;z , is the total number of observed corrupt exchanges between officials from country z and firms from all other headquarters countries, first enforced in those countries. The denominator is the total number of similar cases which could be observed if cases of corruption were distributed according to the ratio of exports of country i to z (X iz ) with respect to the total amount of country i exports to the rest of the world:
cases obs HQ i;j :
The denominator may be interpreted as the total number of cross-border corruption cases involving country z public officials, first enforced elsewhere, that could be observed if the level of corruption of public officials were the same in all countries. If the actual and expected values are equal, then the PACI equals 100. The lowest value that the index may take is zero, which obtains when no corruption case (first enforced in all headquarters countries) is registered in country z.
The composite PACI
The PACI ALL z or "composite PACI" follows the same logic of the simple PACI z . However, it accounts for cases that were first enforced not only in all headquarters countries but also in other countries (1) (2) except z. Cases that are first enforced in a third country w, meanwhile, are denominated as cases obs OTH w i;j (where i,j 6 ¼ w). The index is then shown as:
cases obs OTH
Eðcases obs
Eðcases obs OTH w i;z Þ Á 100 with i6 ¼j, w6 ¼i,j, D is the number of third countries that first enforced cases, and for the denominator the following holds:
Eðcases obs OTH
cases obs OTH w i;j
The interpretation of the PACI ALL z is conceptually the same as that of the PACI z (Eq. 1), but it considers all available cases of observed cross-border corruption, first enforced either in the country where firms are headquartered or within the jurisdictions of third countries. This is the version of the index computed in this article.
Conditional Probability of Observing Zero Cases
It is also important to demonstrate the varying precision with which the PACI measures corruption, which is influenced by the total number of transactions between countries as represented by bilateral trade flows. To fix ideas, consider the case of a foreign country that has no reported incident of crossborder corruption. Such a situation could be interpreted as a signal that corruption in the said foreign country is relatively low, but not necessarily equal to zero. The strength of such a signal depends on the number of cross-border transactions, proxied by imports. To express this concept, the "probability of observing zero cases, conditional on the probability of corruption being equal in all foreign countries" is introduced:
where Prcorr FO z is the underlying probability that a public official accepts a bribe (see Appendix A) and c is a constant. The measure expresses the probability that no case involving country z public officials (first enforced in the headquarters country) is observed when the true country z probability that a cross-border transaction involving its public officials is corrupt is the same everywhere in the world. Przero cases PACI z may be computed as the product of individual probabilities:
Each one of these probabilities, referring to a rare event, is described by a Poisson distribution and may be easily computed by making the condition Prcorr indicate that the country in question has relatively few cross-border transactions -that is, information is relatively scarce.
II. Computing the PACI
Information on cases of cross-border corruption from 1977 until the end of 2012 were collected using various sources (See Appendix B). However, only cases reported in 1998 onwards were used,
approximately coinciding with the effectivity of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Out of a total of 979 cases detailed in this study, 796 cases were first enforced either in the headquarters country (569), in the United States acting as a third country jurisdiction (177), or in other third country jurisdictions (50). The remaining 183 cases that were first enforced in foreign countries were not considered for the purpose of computing the PACI.
Each case was coded according to the observed outcome. They were classified "positive" if the accused party was either found guilty or, while not admitting guilt, conceded to the payment of a fine (as in the case of a "consent to a cease-and-desist order" in the US); 8 "not positive" if the case was eventually dropped and no action was taken; or "ongoing" if no available evidence was found to determine whether the case is "positive" or "not positive." The term public official is used in a broad sense, encompassing both bureaucrats and politicians. Table 2 indicates that out of 796 cases that may be used to compute the PACI, 444 are classified as positive, 272 as ongoing, while the rest have either been dropped or have resulted in an acquittal. Firms are shown to be headquartered in 40 countries, comprised mostly of industrialized nations. Among them, the United States takes the lion's share in the number of cases enforced, reflecting both its early adoption of the FCPA and the proactive stance adopted by its Department of Justice (DOJ) and SEC after its ratification of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Germany, Britain, and France follow in the list.
The list of countries where public officials are seen to be on the receiving end of alleged bribery is more extensive (Table 3) . At least one case is recorded in 128 countries. China leads the list with 88 cases, followed by Nigeria.
To compute the index of public administration corruption, PACI ALL z , all 796 cases, regardless of their outcomes, were considered (Table 4) . The inclusion of all the cases is justified by the presence of a high burden of proof in order to lead to a conviction. Thus, false negatives are likely to be more numerous than false positives. However, in order to accommodate a more agnostic view on this issue, the study computes the index by excluding cases that have been dropped or have resulted in an acquittal. It also computes the PACI by excluding cases involving public agencies in charge of health and telecommunications sectors, for reasons discussed in Section IV of this paper. The combination of these alternatives results in the computation of four versions of the PACI, whose reciprocal Spearman rank correlations range between 0.885 and 0.945 (Table 5) . These computations will be discussed in their entirety in the succeeding section.
The probability of observing zero cases, under the condition that probability of corruption is equal in all foreign countries, Przero cases PACI z , is used to rank those countries that have no observed cases of corruption first enforced abroad, and also to exclude very small countries for which the available information is not deemed to be sufficient. Canada and Finland, for instance, reported zero cases of corruption (first enforced abroad) involving their public officials. For Finland, such probability equals 1.3 percentbeing a middle-sized economy, it is rather unlikely for Finland not to observe any cases, if the probability that public officials accept bribes were the same in Finland as in the rest of the world. For Canada, on the other hand, Przero cases PACI z ¼0.0000. In this case, the signal provided by the PACI, indicating that the level of corruption in Canada is low, is very strong and illustrates that Canada, which is a bigger country, generates more information than Finland.
Przero cases PACI z provides a useful indication of the precision of the PACI also for countries with at least one case of corruption on record. For smaller countries, the signal that the PACI provides is rather noisy because of the rarity of observed corruption events. For example, the probability of observing zero cases in Tunisia would be equal to 0.31 in a situation where the level of corruption is the same everywhere in the world. Notably, two cases were actually observed, close to twice as many as the expected figure if cases were distributed according to trade shares, with a resulting PACI of about 170 and a ranking measure for Tunisia similar to that indicated by the WB-CCI and the TI-CPI (see the last two columns of Table 4 ). Notes: Cases are those first enforced in the headquarters country or in any third-country jurisdiction. The "headquarters country" is where the firm which allegedly bribed public officials abroad is headquartered. Positive Cases refer to cases that were concluded with a judgment in favor of the prosecution or a settlement. Ongoing cases are those that are still pending. 
III. The PACI and Perception-Based Measures: A Comparison
The differences in the rankings yielded by the PACI and the WB-CCI and TI-CPI are also explored (see last columns of Table 4 ), where the perception-based measures used are for the year 2005, the middle of the time interval of reference of the PACI. A positive value indicates that a given country is considered to be relatively more corrupt based on the PACI. In most cases, differences are modest. However, results diverge considerably for a few countries. These information are summarized by showing the Spearman rank correlations between the different versions of the PACI and the perception-based alternatives (Table 5 ). The rank correlations of PACI 1 , the version which includes all cases (presented in Table 4 ), with perception-based measures are rather high, typically pegged at above 0.7. While the ranking based on the PACI is similar to the rankings based on the two most popular perception-based indices, the scales appear to be very different (Figure 1 ). Panel A shows a scatter diagram of the PACI together with the WB-CCI for 2005, while Panel B shows the same indices, with the PACI log-transformed. The Pearson correlation of log(PACI) and WB-CCI is quite high (equal to À0.841).
The study also seeks to examine whether the observed differences between the PACI and perceptionbased measures of corruption are systematic, and to the extent that they might be, what determines Notes: Cases are those first enforced in the headquarters country or in any third-country jurisdiction. The "foreign country" is the country where the act of (alleged) corruption took place.
9 Note that more corruption corresponds to lower values of the WB-CCI and the TI-CPI indices, but to higher values for the PACI and the TI-GCB. them. The residual of a linear regression between the log of the PACI and the WB-CCI (as in Figure 1 .B) or the TI-CPI is considered and denoted as "measurement residuals" -mesres WB-CCI and mesres TI-CPI , respectively. Negative (positive) values indicate that a given country appears to be less (more) corrupt according to the PACI as opposed to the perception-based index used. Whether these differences are correlated with Przero cases PACI z is determined first. If the precision of the PACI deteriorates significantly with respect to smaller countries, while the precision of the perception-based measures remains intact (or deteriorates to a lesser degree), then the absolute value of the measurement residuals could be expected to be positively correlated with Przero cases PACI z . This, however, is not the case. The correlation between the absolute values of mesres WB-CCI and mesres TI-CPI and Przero cases PACI z is seen to be insignificant, pegged at À0.0524 and À0.1001, respectively. This result indicates that any problem which may beset the precision of the PACI in measuring corruption in small countries, would also be shared by the two perception-based alternatives.
Subsequently, the study selected a set of variables which may be linked to biases in favor of or against either measure.
10 Variables of an economic and demographic nature, namely: per capita GDP based on purchasing-power-parity (gdp_cap), population (pop), and the ratio of public expenditure over GDP (r_g/gdp) are considered. Variables that express the ease with which publicly relevant information is generated and debated upon, as well as the democratic attributes of a country, are also contemplated. Also included in such examination are emp_rights, an index of empowerment rights; free_press and free_-speech, which respectively measure the operationalization of the guarantees to free press and free speech; voice_acc, a measure of voice and accountability; democ, an index of democratization; checks, which measures systems of checks and balances; and stability, which measures political stability. To test whether the observed residuals follow some recognizable geographic pattern, a set of geographic dummies is also considered. Pairwise correlations between mesres WB-CCI , mesres TI-CPI , and these variables are thus shown (Table 6 ). Results excluding the ten biggest (in absolute value) measurement residuals, roughly corresponding to ten percent of the available observations, are also presented. Two of the geographic dummies are significantly correlated with both types of measurement residuals. Countries in the American continents, on average, appear to be less corrupt according to the PACI, compared to when either of the perception-based measures are used. The opposite, however, can be seen for countries in Africa and the Middle East. Populous countries also appear to fare better according to the PACI. Countries that are more democratic and have stronger checks and balances appear to be less corrupt on average when the PACI is used. The significance of some of the other variables, meanwhile, depends on which measurement residual is considered and on whether outliers are included. In interpreting the results, the squared estimated correlation coefficient should be noted to represent the fraction of the variance of the measurement residuals that is explained by a given variable (the R 2 of the bivariate ordinary least-squares regression). Such fraction is always rather small, even when the estimated correlation coefficient is statistically significant. To go beyond simple bivariate correlations, a multivariate regression is also considered (Table 7) . Here, the dependent variable is either mesres WB-CCI or mesres TI-CPI and the regressors consist of all the explanatory variables described earlier.
11 As in the bivariate analysis, results obtained by excluding the ten observations of the dependent variable having the greatest absolute value were also reported. Only few of the explanatory variables considered are statistically significant and all the regressors only explain 30 to 35 percent of the total variability of the measurement residuals. A significant negative effect for the dummy variable pertaining to the American continents, in three out of four cases, can still be found. The effect of the dummy variable on Africa and the Middle East, detected in the bivariate Table 4 ; our preferred index).
2: All cases, with the exclusion of health and telecom administration. 3: Only "positive" and "ongoing" cases, all administrations. 11 The dummy for Europe and Central Asia was excluded to avoid the dummy variable trap. The estimated coefficients of the other dummies should then be interpreted as the estimated effect relative to that reference group of countries.
analysis, is now insignificant. Countries where the index of democratization (democ) is higher appear to be less corrupt according to the PACI. The same applies to countries having a high share of public expenditure over GDP (r_g/gdp). Population is also seen to have a significant effect in two out of four cases. Overall, differences between the PACI and the two leading perception-based cross-national measures of corruption appear to be rather idiosyncratic, at least with respect to the set of factors considered. 
IV. The Validity of the PACI
This section discusses the assumptions necessary for the PACI to be considered a valid measure of corruption. While Appendix A presents these assumptions formally, to show how they imply index validity, the focus here is on their overall meaning and, most importantly, on the extent to which they may hold in practice.
The first assumption is that the probability of observing a corrupt transaction involving firms from country i (and enforced first in the same country, or in third country jurisdictions) and public officials in country j does not depend on the identity of country j. It implies that the judiciary, when deciding which cases to pursue, does not "discriminate" based on the foreign officials' nationality. The possibility of assessing the levels of corruption in the foreign country by looking at the geographical distribution of cases first enforced elsewhere hinges on this key assumption. Whether this assumption can be relied upon is an empirical question. McLean (2012) evaluated the relevance of foreign policy considerations and opportunities for enforcement cooperation in determining the geographic distribution of FCPA cases, and found that bilateral frameworks for securities regulation and enforcement cooperation appear to be associated with higher levels of FCPA implementation. However, the magnitude of such an effect was found to be rather modest. The same study did not find other candidate explanatory variables to have any significant effect. Choi and Davis (2012) also found little evidence contradicting the first assumption.
The assumption could also be violated if the probability of detecting corruption cases depended on the conditions surrounding freedom of expression and information in the foreign country. However, the available data indicate that most cases are first enforced based on evidence gathered in the headquarters countries. Furthermore, supposing that the relevant perception-based measure is unbiased, the variables that capture a liberal environment for expression and the circulation of information in the foreign country would be expected to positively affect the measurement residuals introduced in the earlier sections (implying that the PACI in those cases would reveal a higher level of corruption compared to its perception-based counterpart). Three variables expressing the various dimensions of the ease of expression and circulation of information (free_press, free_speech and voice_acc; see Appendix B for a description) were considered and the results of both bivariate and multivariate analysis (Table 6 and 7) indicate a statistical significance only in very few cases, while pointing to the presence of marginal effects at most. Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are between parentheses. **p-value < 0.1; **p-value < 0.05; ***p-value < 0.001. For a description of the variables, see the note at the bottom of Table 6 and Appendix B. Countries for which PACI z ¼ 0 and Przero cases PACI z > 0.015 and countries for which PACI z > 10000 have been excluded.
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12 The probability of detection and enforcement may also be sector-specific. For example, corruption in the arms trade is likely to be more difficult to detect as national security concerns may limit the actions available to the judiciary (see also Rose-Ackerman 1999) . To address such issues, the PACI could be computed separately for different sectors of the economy.
Assumptions 2 and 3 in Appendix A are rather technical, and describe how the probability of offering a bribe, or accepting a bribe when offered, may depend on the level of corruption in the other country. Of more interest is assumption 4, which establishes that the number of cross-border transactions is proportional to bilateral trade flows. An alternative proxy for cross-border transactions would be foreign direct investments (FDI) (as in Choi and Davis 2012 and Mclean 2012) . However, many transactions are not reflected in FDI flows, nor stocks, and FDI eventually enable trade flows between the countries involved. For these reasons, the choice of proxy made in this study seems to be more appropriate.
Differences in the scope of the public sector in different countries would also be a cause for concern. For instance, a pharmaceutical firm headquartered in country A successfully bribes hospital employees in country B and C in order to sell its products. If country B runs a public health system, the bribery incident would qualify as a case of cross-border corruption of a foreign public official. On the other hand, if country C's hospitals are managed by the private sector, the bribery incident would qualify as a case of private sector corruption and, as such, would not be included in this study's dataset. At first glance, neglecting this difference may be seen to lead to an underestimation of the level of corruption in country B with respect to C since, ceteris paribus, more corruption cases are registered in the former than in the latter, due to the wider scope of the public sector in country B. Apparently, in this case, trade flows would not serve as a good proxy for cross-national exchanges involving public officials in a given country, since for each dollar of imports there would be more interactions with public officials in country B than in country C. To account for this issue, this study computed the PACI without regard for cases involving procurement in the health and the telecommunication sectors (as opposed to transactions involving regulatory bodies in those sectors since they are invariably public). Arguably, these are the main sectors that are prone to stark variations in terms of government activism.
13 Different choices, however, seem to deliver similar results (see Table 5 ).
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V. Discussion
The PACI reflects a narrow definition of corruption: the propensity of public officials to accept bribes from foreign firms. 15 In denominating the index as a general "public administration" measure of corruption, the study implicitly assumes that what is observed by means of cross-country corruption statistics is also informative of the level of corruption in the public sector as a whole. Obviously, this assumption may be put to question, especially since levels of corruption may vary sensibly across public institutions within a given country. This article, however, argues that adopting narrow definitions of a phenomenon is desirable because it facilitates the testability of the assumptions on which hinges any extensive interpretation of the resulting measures. For this reason, the PACI represents a welcome departure from most indices of governance currently available, where "sometimes it is not clear what precisely is being measured, rendering questionable the validity of at least some of the proxies" (Klitgaard and Light 1998) . Such a state of affairs may reflect a 13 Alternatively, the number of cases for the relative size of the public sector in different countries could be corrected.
However, the concept of public sector is blurry, particularly in some countries. Generally, the decision on how to account for the variable scope of public sectors worldwide depends on the position which the researcher takes on conceptual issues that are the subjects of debate. 14 If the interest lies in measuring the magnitude of public sector corruption, instead of its frequency, then cross-country variations in the scope of activities of the public sector should not be a cause for concern. The scope of government is also arguably endogenous over the long-run since corrupt elites have an interest in maintaining and possibly expanding their reach. 15 A Bribe Payer's Corruption Index (BPCI) may also be computed along the same lines as the PACI, but using cases first enforced in the foreign country. However, the scarcity of data proves to be an obstacle towards its computation.
situation "experienced in many 'new areas' of the social sciences: an explosion of measures, with little progress toward theoretical clarity or practical utility" (Klitgaard et al. 2005, 414) . Quite likely, as "open data" become more widely available, more measures of governance, based on hard data, and narrowly defined like the PACI, would be ushered (see the discussion in Picci 2011, 117-119) . Such a development, in turn, will facilitate greater theoretical clarity. Data availability, as seen, poses certain constraints to the usefulness of the PACI. This limitation is the reason why this paper opted to demonstrate its application using a 15-year period. However, when comparing this attribute of the PACI with the TI-CPI, it should be noted that Transparency International has warned against making comparisons with their index across time, in light of annual changes in the methodology and country coverage. In other words, to some extent, the advantage of having a yearly measure is more apparent than real. 16 As more countries sign the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, more cases are likely to be reported, lending more precision to the PACI and allowing its computation for shorter intervals of time. Also, more data would permit the separate computation of the PACI for different sectors, and the resulting measures could eventually be aggregated into a general index. This paper shows that, under a set of assumptions, the PACI is valid in the sense that it registers a higher value in countries where the probability that a transaction is corrupt is higher. The validity of the index is sufficient in delivering a correct ranking of countries. In a previous version of this article, it was shown that under a further assumption, the PACI represents the probability that a transaction is corrupt, relative to a world average. To illustrate, if the PACI equals 200 for a given country, it would imply that the probability of corruption in that country is twice a world average. However, it is left for future studies to explore the plausibility of such an interpretation, which may be appealing due to its practical applications but may be unrealistic. A better understanding of this issue would be welcome, considering that current cross-national measures of corruption are wanting in this respect. For example, in the 2014 TI-CPI, Germany and Turkey registered scores of 79 and 45 and rank 12 th and 64 th in the list of countries, respectively. The differences imply that the (perceived) level of corruption in Turkey is considerably higher than in Germany, but the index used does not allow any interpretation regarding how much more corruption there is in the latter compared to the former. Under this light it should also be interpreted the finding that the PACI is highly correlated with the main perception-based measures of corruption, but it has a different scale. It was shown earlier that the scales become comparable once the log of the PACI is taken. If the PACI indeed approximates the probability that a transaction is corrupt with respect to a world average, then the exponential of the WB-CCI and the TI-CPI would be approximately proportional to levels of corruption. Thus, further work in this direction might help clarify the scales of existing perception-based indicators.
Other venues for future research could be foreseen. First, the availability of the PACI spurs a reassessment of the literature on the causes and consequences of corruption. As mentioned earlier, more data would allow the computation of the PACI for separate sectors of the economy. It would also be interesting to study the differences among several versions of the same indices, computed by focusing on different jurisdictions (along the lines of the presentation in Table 1 ). Since they all measure the same concept of corruption, they are expected to provide similar results. Thus, any variance among them could be explained by sampling error but also, possibly, by the violation of one or more of the maintained assumptions-the bigger the violation, the bigger the divergence. Tests for the validity of the maintained assumptions could be developed by leveraging on the magnitude of such observed differences.
Lastly, the same intuition behind the use of judicial statistics in this article, could be applied to other domains. The essential ingredients needed for this are data culled from different jurisdictions that convey information on crimes committed in a given country by actors residing in another country. Some types of financial crimes may possibly lend themselves to a treatment based on the methodology introduced in this paper.
Appendix A. Assumptions and Validity of the PACI.
For a corrupt transaction to occur, both parties must be willing to engage in it. Firms headquartered in country i may decide to offer bribes to public officials in the foreign country j, with a probability that depends on the attributes of the foreign country. In particular, the probability that firms would offer bribes may be higher if the perceived level of corruption in the foreign country is high. This is because high levels of corruption would imply a lower risk of being caught and a higher social tolerance for bribery. The probability that a public official in the foreign country accepts a bribe when offered one may also depend on the attributes of the headquarters country. For example, if the latter is known to be proactive in curbing cross-border corruption, public officials may be deterred because the discovery of a corrupt act in the headquarters country may be followed by prosecution in the public officials' respective countries.
The probability that a public official in country j accepts a bribe, when he perceives that there is no risk of getting caught following a case first enforced in the headquarters country, is defined by pr c orr FO j . The advantage of this concept is that, logically, it does not depend on the attributes of the headquarters country, as it purely reflects the propensity of country j's public officials to accept bribes. This probability is identified as the level of corruption demonstrated by public officials in the foreign country. Meanwhile, a measure of corruption is deemed valid if it is monotonically increasing in the level of corruption.
Definition. The PACI is valid if: @PACI z =@ pr c orr FO z > 0. The expected number of corruption cases observed and enforced first in the headquarters country i, involving public officials in the foreign country j, is determined as follows:
cases obs HQ i;j ¼ pr o bs HQ i;j Á corr exch i;j where corr exch i;j is the number of occurrences of corruption involving firms headquartered in country i and public officials in country j (which will later be equate to its expected value) and pr o bs HQ i;j is the probability that the corrupt exchange is observed, and enforced first in the headquarters country.
The expected number of corrupt exchanges is: corr exch i;j ¼ pr b ribe HQ i;j Á pr b ribe FO i;j Á transactions i;j where pr b ribe HQ i;j is the probability that a firm headquartered in country i proposes a bribe to public officials in foreign country j, while pr b ribe FO i;j is the probability that the public official in j accepts the bribe offered by the firm headquartered in i. Meanwhile, transactions i,j is the total number of business transactions involving firms in country i and public officials in foreign country j. This formulation simply states that in order for a corrupt transaction to occur, both parties have to agree upon its execution. The possibility of extortion is ruled out, so that the probability that a transaction is corrupt is equal to a product of probabilities. Statistical independence between these events is not assumed, and the possibility that the probabilities of offering and accepting bribes are interdependent will be explicitly discussed subsequently.
Assumption 1
The probability that a corrupt transaction involving firms from country i and public officials in country j is observed and first enforced in country i does not depend on the identity of the foreign country j: pr o bs HQ i;j ¼ pr o bs HQ i
This assumption is of key importance because it is the basis for using the geographic distribution of the cases involving country i firms to infer levels of corruption in all other countries.
Assumption 2 The probability that for a given cross-border transaction, a firm headquartered in country i offers a bribe to public officials in country j is as follows:
